After years of preparation, Poland has entered the licensing phase for its first nuclear power plant. At the end of March, it submitted a comprehensive construction permit application for three American reactors.
This article is a translation of a Polish article published by Focus Europe.
On 31 March 2026, Poland's state-owned company Polskie Elektrownie Jądrowe (PEJ) formally submitted an application to the President of the National Atomic Energy Agency for a construction permit for the country's first nuclear power plant at the Lubiatowo-Kopalino site. After fifteen years of modern planning and several decades of intermittent national debate, the project has finally moved beyond political symbolism and entered the rigorous phase of institutional scrutiny.
The application itself is a massive document—more than 40,000 pages prepared by over 200 experts in nuclear safety, radiation protection, engineering and geology.
Its foundation is the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report, designed to demonstrate compliance with the world's strictest nuclear safety standards while marking a historic turning point in Poland's energy transition.
According to PEJ, the launch of the licensing procedure subjects the project to a comprehensive assessment by Poland's nuclear regulators, an essential prerequisite before any construction work can begin.
Under the current timetable, major construction is expected to start in 2028 after obtaining a separate construction permit from the Pomeranian Voivodeship authorities, which is anticipated in 2027.
A Geopolitical Bet on the United States
The project's technological partnership carries significant geopolitical weight.
Poland has selected three Westinghouse AP1000 reactors with a combined capacity of 3,750 MW, to be built in the Pomeranian region.
Engineering and construction will be led by Bechtel. Wojciech Kukuła, a member of the board of the environmental law organisation ClientEarth Lawyers for the Earth, notes that the choice of reactor technology is effectively settled.
"Poland is purchasing a specific technology that is already available on the market from a supplier that currently offers no newer alternative," he says.
The decision extends far beyond engineering. Poland's nuclear programme is also intended to reinforce its strategic partnership with the United States, reflected in a financing agreement with the U.S. Export-Import Bank covering preparatory and design work. While Poland will own the physical infrastructure, it will not own the underlying reactor technology—a limitation likely to shape the programme for decades.
Financially, the project is backed by a state aid package worth PLN 178 billion (approximately €42 billion), approved by the European Commission in December 2025.
The unprecedented support scheme rests on three pillars: recapitalisation of PEJ by the State Treasury, full government-backed loan guarantees, and a 40-year Contract for Difference (CfD).
Under the CfD mechanism, the strike price is set at PLN 500 per megawatt-hour, indexed to inflation. If market prices fall below that level, the government pays the difference. If prices rise above it, the operator returns the surplus to the state budget.
The model mirrors the UK's Hinkley Point C project, where consumers effectively help finance the investment through electricity bills. For investors, however, the main advantage of the CfD is predictability, allowing long-term financial planning and project financing based on guaranteed future revenues.
Market interest has been exceptionally strong. A recent market consultation attracted 26 financing offers, significantly exceeding the project's funding requirements, alongside expressions of interest from 11 export credit agencies worth around PLN 100 billion.
The nuclear programme forms a central pillar of Poland's broader energy transition as the country accelerates the phase-out of coal-fired power plants and gradually withdraws subsidies for fossil fuels.
Forty Years of Guarantees and a New Political Contest
The Polish government plans to commission between 6 and 9 GW of nuclear capacity from the mid-2030s onward, enough to supply roughly one-third of the country's current electricity demand.
PEJ emphasises that the plant will provide a stable, dispatchable and carbon-free source of electricity for more than 60 years, serving as a crucial stabilising force in a power system increasingly dependent on intermittent renewable energy.
Unlike coal, nuclear power requires enormous upfront investment but offers relatively low operating costs, without significant fuel expenses or carbon emission charges.
At the same time, political competition has already begun over the location of Poland's second nuclear power plant.
Following talks with French President Emmanuel Macron, Prime Minister Donald Tusk described France as a serious potential partner for the second project and proposed Bełchatów as the leading candidate because of its industrial infrastructure and social considerations.
Wojciech Wrochna, the government's commissioner for strategic energy infrastructure, confirmed that Bełchatów and Konin remain the preferred locations, with Połaniec and Kozienice serving as backup options.
Replacing coal with nuclear energy in Poland's traditional industrial regions is politically attractive. However, analysts warn that mining communities fear an accelerated nuclear programme could hasten mine closures without providing sufficiently robust transition plans for workers.
A final decision on the technology supplier for the second plant—currently contested by Canadian, American and French companies—is expected by 2027.
Small Modular Reactors Could Help Decarbonise Heating
Alongside these large-scale ambitions, Poland is also debating the future role of small modular reactors (SMRs).
Although Orlen previously announced plans to commission the world's first commercial SMR by 2030, Wojciech Kukuła remains sceptical, pointing out that the technology is not yet commercially available.
SMRs nevertheless offer one significant advantage: they can simultaneously generate electricity and heat, whereas large conventional reactors typically waste much of their thermal energy.
Although no binding timetable has been established, conceptual plans already envisage deploying SMRs at the Żerań power plant in Warsaw to supply the city's district heating network. The proposal aligns with the EU Taxonomy, which increasingly encourages investment in nuclear energy, particularly small modular reactors.
March 2026 therefore marks the end of a long historical chapter. A project that originated decades ago, reaching back to the communist era, has finally evolved from political aspiration into a tangible industrial undertaking.
The large-scale recapitalisation of PEJ and its recruitment drive four years ago signalled that the programme had moved beyond political rhetoric. The key challenge over the next 24 months will be maintaining the project schedule while controlling costs during the licensing process and the negotiation of major supply contracts.
Those hurdles will ultimately determine whether Poland's nuclear programme becomes a cornerstone of the country's physical infrastructure—or remains an expensive symbol of political ambition.
