For the Visegrád countries, credible defence is inseparable from NATO membership.
Yet they are entering a new security era from very different starting points. Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary are all undergoing a costly process of rebuilding their armed forces while replacing Soviet-era equipment that no longer meets today's security requirements. But decades of underinvestment cannot be reversed overnight.
Rearmament alone has not delivered strategic autonomy. Their military capabilities continue to be shaped by foreign suppliers, personnel shortages and weaknesses in domestic defence industries. Together, these factors determine what each country can realistically contribute to NATO—and how effectively.
For the Visegrád Four, credible defence is closely linked to NATO membership. However, they face today's security challenges from markedly different positions. Poland is rearming at remarkable speed and on an unprecedented scale, with much of its future military capability built around American and South Korean technology.
Czechia has ambitious modernisation plans but still struggles with shortages of personnel, inadequate infrastructure and the absence of a fully operational heavy brigade.
Slovakia has preserved a significant ammunition industry, yet it remains dependent on its allies for air policing, intelligence and key aspects of territorial defence.
Hungary has attracted major European defence manufacturers, but its military modernisation programme has been overshadowed by controversies surrounding opaque privatisations, politically connected business interests and growing concerns among NATO allies.
Russia's war against Ukraine has delivered one fundamental lesson: an arsenal alone does not create an effective defence system. Real military capability requires not only modern weapons, but also trained personnel, resilient supply chains, competent public administration, political stability and the confidence of allies.
After decades of underfunding, the Visegrád countries must adapt not only to new technologies, but also to the realities of twenty-first-century warfare.
Poland: Building a Regional Military Power
Poland has gone furthest in turning Russia's invasion of Ukraine into a comprehensive national rearmament programme. Defence spending has increased almost fivefold over the past six years and is now approaching five percent of GDP.
Particular attention has been devoted to strengthening the strategically vulnerable Suwałki Gap. Yet signing major procurement contracts does not automatically translate into immediate military capability. The Ministry of Defence must integrate new systems into service, train personnel, establish maintenance infrastructure and simultaneously replace equipment transferred to Ukraine.
Poland's new arsenal has been deliberately built through international partnerships. The United States is supplying F-35 fighter jets, Patriot air defence systems, the IBCS battle management system, HIMARS rocket launchers and Apache helicopters. South Korea is providing K2 tanks, K9 self-propelled howitzers, FA-50 combat aircraft and Chunmoo rocket systems.
These agreements also include plans for domestic production and technology transfer. According to Lieutenant General Jarosław Gromadziński, the urgency of the security situation left Poland with few alternatives, as European manufacturers were unable to replace hundreds of tanks and other military systems donated to Ukraine quickly enough.
Modernisation nevertheless remains uneven. Security analyst Mariusz Marszałkowski describes it as "island modernisation." Cutting-edge systems such as the F-35 and Patriot coexist with neglected naval capabilities and outdated support equipment.
Nor was Poland's domestic defence industry prepared for such a dramatic increase in demand. After years of surviving on a trickle of orders, it lacked skilled workers, manufacturing capacity and sufficiently advanced products.
Political instability has further complicated the process. State-owned defence group PGZ has had twelve chief executives in just thirteen years. Gromadziński therefore advocates adopting a cross-party "Constitution for Security" that would shield long-term defence programmes from electoral cycles while simplifying the fragmented command structure.
Although Poland is building the strongest military in Central Europe, Marszałkowski believes it will still need approximately five more years before it can reliably defend its territory without decisive reliance on allied support.
Slovakia: Greater Security, Deeper Dependence
The modernisation of Slovakia's long-neglected armed forces began after Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, but only became a genuine political priority following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
To support Ukraine's defence, Bratislava transferred MiG-29 fighter aircraft and its S-300 air defence system to Kyiv. At the same time, it accelerated the replacement of outdated Soviet equipment with NATO-compatible systems.
The Slovak Armed Forces are now acquiring American F-16 fighter jets and Black Hawk helicopters, German Leopard tanks, Swedish CV90 infantry fighting vehicles and Israel's Barak MX air defence system. These investments reduce dependence on Russia but simultaneously create new long-term reliance on Western suppliers, maintenance infrastructure and political cooperation within NATO.
The transition has also created temporary security gaps. During this period, Slovakia's airspace has been protected by allied aircraft, including Czech, Polish and Hungarian fighter jets.
NATO forces continue to compensate for other missing domestic capabilities, particularly in air defence.
For a country of 5.4 million people, a certain degree of reliance on allies is inevitable. The more important question is whether Bratislava can maintain sufficient trust among its partners to ensure continued access to sensitive intelligence and rapid assistance during crises.
That trust has been weakened by Prime Minister Robert Fico's disclosure of confidential discussions among allies and by his government's ambiguous approach towards Russia. The consequences have already become visible. Alongside Orbán's Hungary, Slovakia was excluded from some important regional consultations, including initial discussions on the proposed regional "drone wall."
Despite these political challenges, Slovakia possesses a stronger defence industrial base than its size might suggest. It manufactures Zuzana 2 self-propelled howitzers, tactical vehicles, demining systems, small arms and, above all, 155 mm artillery ammunition.
Its specialised defence companies have the potential to become among Europe's leading suppliers, although production expansion remains constrained by limited industrial capacity and pressure on public finances.
Former Slovak ambassador to NATO Tomáš Valášek argues that counter-drone capabilities require "a combination of investments in combat helicopters, subsonic aircraft, drones designed to destroy other drones, and networks of acoustic and electronic sensors."
Slovakia's rearmament is therefore replacing one dependency with another—from Russia to the United States and NATO allies. That dependency need not be a weakness. Common equipment, joint training and shared logistics can strengthen interoperability and resilience, provided domestic political tensions do not continue to erode trust within the Alliance.
Czechia: Ambition Without the Necessary Foundations
After years of underinvestment, the Czech Armed Forces continue to face shortages of funding, equipment and personnel. Recent assessments show that over the past two decades the country has invested approximately CZK 600 billion (€24.8 billion) less in defence than originally planned.
Even in 2025, Czech defence spending remained below NATO's recommended level, reaching only around 1.85 percent of GDP. The situation differs little from the problems the military itself highlighted as early as 2015.
The consequences are visible throughout the armed forces. Czechia lacks sufficient personnel, air defence capacity, long-range precision strike capabilities, ammunition stocks, combat support assets and the infrastructure required to receive allied reinforcements.
The 7th Mechanised Brigade, intended to become the army's heavy combat core, has still not been completed despite being a key priority since the 2015 development strategy.
Administrative shortcomings are equally apparent. Despite investments of CZK 1.8 billion (€74.4 million), military training infrastructure remains inadequate. Priorities have repeatedly shifted, and newly acquired infantry fighting vehicles may have to be stationed away from their home bases because the required facilities have not yet been completed.
Perhaps the most difficult challenge is personnel.
Defence expert Zdeněk Petráš points to competition from the civilian labour market, unfavourable demographic trends and rising demand for technically qualified soldiers.
"A strong labour market does not necessarily help recruitment—quite the opposite," he says.
Jan Ludvík also notes that many soldiers recruited after the abolition of compulsory military service are now reaching retirement. At the same time, the army requires more personnel than ever before.
"So far, it has not been fully successful" in either retaining experienced soldiers or attracting enough new recruits.
NATO membership, operational experience abroad and the gradual replacement of Russian military equipment remain major strengths. However, if Czechia wishes to continue serving as a transport and logistics hub for allied forces, it must urgently modernise its long-neglected military infrastructure.
Hungary: Industrial Capacity and Political Risks
Hungary's Zrínyi defence programme combined the replacement of Soviet and Russian weapon systems with an industrial strategy designed to relocate part of defence production to Hungary.
Partnerships with Rheinmetall, Airbus, Colt CZ and other European manufacturers have led to domestic production of Lynx infantry fighting vehicles, ammunition, small arms and helicopter components.
Hungary has also acquired Leopard 2A7HU tanks, Gripen fighter aircraft and NASAMS air defence systems.
As defence analyst Tamás Csiki Varga explains, NATO members do not need to develop every military capability independently.
"The objective is to ensure that allies can defend themselves and operate together."
This strategy has expanded Hungary's industrial capabilities but has also created new dependencies. Licensed production still requires imported components, foreign technological expertise and long-term cooperation with international partners.
Domestic small and medium-sized enterprises remain only marginally involved in the defence sector, while the industry itself is unlikely to reach the capacity required by the armed forces before 2028–2030.
Hungary also needs to invest far more heavily in unmanned systems and apply the lessons learned from the war in Ukraine. Progress has so far been complicated by Viktor Orbán's strained relationship with Kyiv.
The greatest challenge, however, remains political.
In a controversial move criticised as politically motivated, Hungary's state-owned defence companies were merged into N7 Defence Holding.
Control was subsequently transferred to 4iG Space and Defence Technologies, part of a business group controlled by Orbán ally Gellért Jászai.
The transaction handed over majority stakes in nine strategically important defence companies, while additional subsidies and a nine-year ministry contract worth HUF 1.311 trillion (approximately €3.62 billion) further deepened the links between public procurement and the group. Following its election victory, Péter Magyar's government moved to terminate these agreements.
Rebuilding military capabilities therefore also means restoring institutional trust and personnel stability.
Csiki Varga argues that Hungary "cannot remain an open house for actors whose interests conflict with those of the Alliance."
The new government must rebuild the confidence of its allies, reverse the consequences of the 2023 military purges and address chronically low salaries. At the same time, it needs to recruit more professional soldiers, non-commissioned officers, drivers and armoured vehicle crews.
Hungary has acquired much of the equipment required by a modern NATO military. The greater challenge will be ensuring that it has enough trained personnel and trustworthy institutions capable of employing that equipment effectively.
Four Different Paths to the Same Goal
The experiences of all four Visegrád countries demonstrate that autonomy within NATO does not mean independence from allies. It means possessing the ability to make a meaningful contribution when collective defence is put to the test.
Poland primarily needs to integrate its new military systems effectively while maintaining long-term political continuity. Czechia needs more personnel, modern infrastructure and fully operational military formations. Slovakia needs stronger air defence, counter-drone capabilities and renewed confidence among its allies. Hungary needs more transparent governance and stronger military institutions.
Modern weapons are only part of the equation. Without capable institutions, resilient defence industries, trained personnel and trusted alliances, they cannot by themselves create a truly effective army.
